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ABSTRACT 
 
Inequality Aversion and Risk Attitudes 
 
Using self reported measures of life satisfaction and risk attitudes, we empirically test 
whether there is a relationship between individuals inequality and risk aversion. The empirical 
analysis uses the German SOEP household panel for the years 1997 to 2007 to conclude 
that the negative effect of inequality measured by the sample gini coefficient by year and 
federal state is larger for those individuals who report to be less willing to take risks. 
Nevertheless, the empirical results suggest that even though inequality and risk aversion are 
related, they are not the same thing. The paper shows that the relationship between risk 
attitudes and inequality aversion survives the inclusion of individual characteristics (i.e. 
income, education, and gender) that may be correlated with both risk attitudes and inequality 
aversion. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, there has been an accumulation of empirical evidence suggesting that 
individuals dislike inequality. One of the strategies has been to set up experiments in 
the laboratory (Dawes et al., 2007). The use of self-reported measures of satisfaction or 
well-being as a proxy for utility has been one of the empirical strategies used to this 
end. The few existing empirical studies have shown that inequality, usually measured 
as the gini coefficient in the region or country where the individual lives has a negative 
effect on self-reported well-being or life satisfaction. This means that other things being 
equal individuals in more unequal societies report on average a lower score in the 
satisfaction scale. There are two main reasons that have been put forward to explain 
why individuals may dislike inequality, notably risk aversion and lack of social 
mobility. It has been argued that risk aversion influences the weight that individuals 
give to the risk to have a worse social or income position in the future (Vickerey, 1945; 
Harsanyi, 1955). The link between social mobility and inequality aversion runs through 
expectations regarding own mobility and perceptions of social mobility in own country 
(Bénabou and Ok, 2001). The empirical literature is still scarce and while there is some 
evidence that social mobility relates to preferences for redistribution (e.g. Alesina and 
La Ferrara, 2005), the relationship between risk and inequality aversion has not been 
tested for general population samples. Using a representative survey, this paper 
empirically estimates this relationship by using a self-reported subjective well-being 
measure as a proxy for utility. 
 
The first study using subjective measures to examine inequality aversion is Morawetz 
et al. (1977). They compare the self-rated happiness of two small Israeli communities 
that were similar in (almost) all respects except for their income distribution and 
conclude that individuals were happier in the more egalitarian community. More 
recently, the use of subjective measures to study inequality aversion has been extended 
to large representative samples. For Western Countries, Alesina, Di Tella and 
MacCulloch (2004) find that while European respondents’ life satisfaction is negatively 
affected by inequality, the effect does not hold for American respondents. Similarly, 
Schwarze and Harpfer (2007) show a clear negative impact of inequality on reported 
life satisfaction of Germans. The two studies in European transition countries show that 
the effect of inequality on life satisfaction differs from the Western countries (Sanfey 
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and Teksoz, 2007; and Senik and Grosfeld, 2008), and according to the last authors it 
depends on the level of political trust in the country. These studies examined whether 
inequality aversion was different in various countries with different (perceived) social 
mobility, whether it depended on the political views or income levels of the respondent, 
and whether it was different for pre- or post-government income. None of them 
however examined whether, and to what extent, inequality aversion was related to 
individual risk aversion. 
 
In this paper we examine whether inequality aversion is related to or can be explained 
by individual risk aversion. In contrast with the existing literature we focus on a general 
sample population and using a self-reported measure of satisfaction as a proxy for 
utility, we study whether the correlation between inequality and utility depends on 
individuals’ risk attitudes. Although the relation between inequality and risk aversion is 
theoretically appealing, there is very few empirical evidence on this using a laboratory 
setting. Using experimental data, Carlsson, Daruvala, and Johansson-Stenman (2005) 
conclude that risk aversion and inequality aversion are related concepts to the extend 
that more risk averse people tend to be more inequality averse, although they found 
individuals to exhibit inequality aversion per se (see also Kroll and Davidovitz, 2003 
and Brennan et al., 2008). In this paper we use a large representative panel data set with 
about 25,000 individuals living in Germany and corroborate the relationship between 
risk and inequality aversion. This is, we find that more risk averse individuals also are 
more inequality averse. However, our results also show that risk and inequality 
aversion are clearly not the same thing, i.e. estimates of the former can not be taken as 
proxy of the latter. These results are robust to different specifications, econometric 
methods, and to the inclusion of variables that correlate with individual risk attitudes 
and individual economic vulnerability. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 portraits the theoretical and 
conceptual link between inequality aversion and risk aversion. Section 3 explains the 
empirical strategy and describes the data and key variables, notably our direct measures 
of utility and risk as well as the measure of inequality. Section 4 presents our findings 
while the last section provides concluding comments. 
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2. Inequality and Risk aversion 
Inequality and risk aversion are formally related since Atkinson’s (1970) seminal 
contribution, where he derives inequality measures form a social welfare function 
described as an additive function of individuals’ utilities that in turn depend on income. 
In order to compare income distributions he needs to make some assumptions on the 
form of utility and uses a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) function borrowed 
from the literature of decision-making under uncertainty. Therefore, he formally 
derives a measure of inequality aversion that is early analogue to risk aversion. 1 The 
use of a CRRA function implies to equate the probability of an income (risk) with the 
distribution of income (inequality).  
 
Beyond formal links, inequality and risk have been conceptually thought as closely 
related notions. In a hypothetical original position where individuals’ endowments, 
abilities and other characteristics reveal no information about their future income, risk 
averse individuals will pay a premium to end up in a more equal society. In this 
context, redistribution acts as a mere insurance mechanism. That is, behind the veil of 
ignorance, ex-ante uncertain income prospects are easily linked with ex-post income 
inequality (Cowell and Schokkaert, 2001), and inequality and risk aversion are closely 
related. Taking an extreme view of the hypothetical original position, Harsanyi (1953) 
suggests that, behind the veil of ignorance, income inequality indices may be employed 
as measures of the riskiness of the income distribution, so that inequality aversion and 
risk aversion are the same thing. From an ethical perspective, the link between 
inequality and risk aversion can be related to the ethics of reciprocity, which does not 
require any assumption on the importance of individuals’ endowments and abilities to 
determine income.  
 
The situation behind the veil of ignorance is a useful hypothetical situation, which has 
been used to develop theories of distributive justice (notably Rawls (1971), but also 
Dworkin (1981)), but it is nonetheless too simplistic to explain the distaste individuals 
                                                 
1 Actually Atkinson is very explicit about the parallelisms between risk and inequality that he is using to 
derive his results. For example, as he notes himself the Atkinson index of inequality is equal to the 
proportional risk premium as defined by Pratt (1964) and the concept of equally distributed equivalent 
income is simply the analogue of the certainty equivalent. 
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may have for inequality. Indeed, individuals’ preference for inequality are shaped by 
many factors, the most relevant ones being:2 (i) their own characteristics, such as 
endowments and abilities (current income, for instance, is a good predictor of 
preferences for redistribution; Roemer, 1975; Meltzer and Richard, 1981), (ii) their 
individual history, which in turn shapes subjective expectations on own economic 
position (Picketty, 1995; Bénabou and Ok, 2001; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000; Alesina 
and La Ferrarra, 2005), and (iii) the social norms and fairness perceptions; e.g. in 
societies where individual effort, and not luck, is thought to determine economic 
success, individuals are likely to be less concerned about inequality (Alesina and 
Glaeser, 2004; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005).  
 
The above arguments show that inequality and risk aversion are related but yet distinct 
concepts. To the extent that current income inequality may be informative about 
individual own future income uncertain prospects and that individuals’ sense of justice 
relates to the ethics of reciprocity, we expect the relationship to be positive. 
Nevertheless, and in line with the existing literature, we expect individuals’ dislike for 
inequality to depend on many factors. In the paper we empirically test whether: (i) 
inequality aversion and risk aversion are the same thing, and (ii) they are positively 
related, i.e. more risk averse individuals show a larger distaste for inequality. 
 
3. Empirical strategy 
3.1 The model and its estimation 
We start from the premise that an individual utility (or satisfaction) depends, among 
others, on the inequality existing in the region and time where the individual lives. In 
other words 
 
 ( , )U f X I   (1) 
 
where I is a measure of inequality and X describes the situation in which the individual 
lives. If we assume a concrete functional specification we can rewrite (1) as 
                                                 
2 See Alesina and Giuliano (2009) for a recent comprehensive survey of the many determinants of 
individual preference for redistribution. 
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 U I X      (2) 
 
where we expect β to be negative. The objective of this paper is to try to disentangle 
whether there is a relationship between inequality aversion (β) and risk attitudes. To 
test for the relationship between disliking inequality and risk attitude, we use the 
following specification: 
 
 1 2 3*U I I R R X          (3) 
 
where R represents the individual risk attitude, i.e. the degree of risk aversion. A 
statistically significant β2 coefficient would indicate that the effect that inequality has 
on individual’s satisfaction or utility depends on the individual risk attitude. If 
inequality aversion is, as often argued in the literature, related to risk aversion, one 
would find that more risk averse individuals experience an extra negative effect of 
inequality on happiness through β2.  
 
The empirical test of the specification presented in equation (3) consists on estimating 
 
 1 2 3 1 2it ft ft it it it i itU I I R R X T F                  (4) 
 
where i indicates the individual, t the time, and f the federal state where the respondent 
lives. Equation (4) includes a set of time dummy variables (T), which capture all those 
unobservable variables that are time specific, such as inflation and whether there were 
elections. In addition, we include a set of dummy variables that indicate in which of the 
16 federal states the respondent lives (F). The inclusion of time and region variables 
will allow us to distinguish the inequality effect from other regional and time 
characteristics (e.g., unemployment rate, economic growth) for which we do not 
specifically control. Since we have longitudinal data, we include an individual effect 
(ηi) that captures individual traits that are unobservable and time persistent (e.g. 
optimism and intelligence). Finally, the equation includes the usual error term (ε).  
In the panel data set used in the paper, risk is only asked twice in the whole period. 
Although this is not an important limitation, as risk attitudes tend to be invariable over 
time (see section 3.2 for a discussion), it does imply that there is hardly any variation in 
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the term “β3Rit”. Thus, besides the individual fixed effect specification, we present a 
second regression in which we specify the individual effects ηi as random. The 
individual random effect specification is problematic because, as the literature argues, 
the zero correlation assumption between the individual effect (η) and the explanatory 
variables imposed by the individual random effects estimation may not hold in the data. 
In order to accommodate this concern, we estimate equation (4) with both individual 
fixed and random effects. In order to relax the assumption of no correlation between 
covariates and the individual random effect, we will follow Mundlack (1978) and 
introduce the individual mean across time for those variables for which we suspect that 
correlation may exist (see also Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). These are: 
household income, years of education, number of children, and number of adults.  
 
Since there is virtually no difference in terms of trade-offs between variables and 
statistical significance between estimating equation (4) by means of a linear or an 
ordered categorical estimator (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004), we estimate the 
equation using a linear estimator (OLS extensions). 
 
3.2 Measuring strategy 
Life satisfaction 
The empirical strategy is based on using a self reported measure of life satisfaction as a 
proxy for the theoretical concept of utility (U in equation(4)). The use of these 
questions has considerably increased in recent years, accumulating evidence of its 
empirical validity and its many interesting applications. In the data set used in this 
paper individuals are asked the following question: 
 
Please, answer according to the following scale: 0 means ‘completely dissatisfied’, 10 
‘completely satisfied’. 
 
How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered? 
 
0______1______2______3______4______5______6______7______8______9______10 
completely           
dissatisfied    
Figure 1: Life Satisfaction Question 
 
 8
The answer to such and similar questions is what is known in the literature as subjective 
life satisfaction. The three basic assumptions underlying such measures are: (i) 
individuals are able to evaluate their life satisfaction, (ii) there is a positive monotonic 
relationship between the answer to such questions and the theoretical concept we are 
interested in, and (iii) the answer to such questions are interpersonal comparable. A 
good account of such measures, the underlying assumptions, its applications, and its 
(empirical) validity can be found in Clark, Frijters, and Shields (2008), Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters (2004), and Senik (2005)3.  
 
Risk attitudes 
In 2004 and 2006 individuals responding to the SOEP panel data were asked to report 
their willingness to take risk, which we take as our measure of risk attitudes (R in 
equation(4)). The question runs as follows: 
 
How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do 
you try to avoid taking risks?  
 
Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means: 'risk averse' and the value 10 means: 
'fully prepared to take risks'. You can use the values in between to make your estimate.  
 
 
0_____1______2______3______4______5______6______7______8______9______10 
Risk     
averse    
Figure 2: Direct measure of risk attitude 
 
The answer to this question provides a direct measure of risk on an 11 point scale. Such 
measure contrasts with indirect approaches in which measures of risk attitudes are 
derived from observed behavior, such as playing the lottery or investing in risky assets. 
Direct measures of risk can be easily introduced in general large household panel 
questionnaires, as the present case proofs. This allows the researcher to test for new 
ideas in general large population surveys, which contrasts with the most experimental 
studies done with small groups of individuals, and that are often difficult to generalize 
to the whole population. In other words, the use of general measures of risk attitudes (or 
attitudes in general) opens up new lines of research in the same way that the subjective 
                                                 
3 See also Dolan, Peasgood, and White (2008) and Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004 and 2008) for 
other recent surveys. 
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satisfaction measures did. Nevertheless, it is important to validate this direct measure of 
risk. Fortunately, this has been done by a group of economists (Dohmen et al., 2005) 
involved in the introduction of this survey measure in the German SOEP. Their main 
result is that there is a relationship between the answer to the risk question (Figure 2) 
and individual behavior. To come to this conclusion, the authors perform a 
complementary experiment with a group of individuals that are comparable to the ones 
answering the German SOEP data. In addition, the authors show that there is a 
correlation between the reported willingness to take risk and self reported behavior in 
the questionnaire, such as holding stocks, smoking, and occupational choice. We have 
also examined the relationship between this measure of risk attitude and a set of 
individual characteristics that are known to correlate with risk attitudes and came to 
very consistent results, e.g. women are more risk averse, and years of education and 
income correlate negatively with risk aversion.  
 
Since the risk attitude questions were only asked in 2004 and in 2006, we can only 
estimate the model described in section 3.1 if we assume that risk attitude is a rather 
persistent trait, i.e. individuals´ risk attitudes do not change often over time. Although 
the empirical evidence suggests that this is not a strong assumption4, we check it by 
looking at the differences reported in the two years. In the data there are about 18,000 
individuals who report their willingness to take risk in those two years. On the 0 to 10 
scale, the difference between these two measures is only 0.30. In the sample, there are 
25.3% of individuals who report the same number in the two waves, and 30% who 
report a 1 point difference (on the 0 to 10 scale) between the two years. That is, 55% of 
the sample has a variation in reported risk of 1 or less. Another 20% reports a 2 point 
difference, while about 25% of the sample reports a 3 or more difference points 
between the two years. The data therefore seems to indicate that risk attitude is a rather 
persistent trait even though some changes do seem to occur, at least in the reported risk 
attitude. In the paper we use the 2004 measure to proxy risk attitudes between 1997 and 
2004 and the answers of 2006 to proxy the years 2005 to 2007. Using data prior to 1997 
imposes risk attitudes to be constant for longer than 8 years and we therefore only use 
the 1997-2007 waves. 
 
                                                 
4 This is true, for example, to the extent that risk behavior is related to personality traits (see, for example, 
Cooper, Agocha, and Sheldon, 2000; and Zuckerman and Kuhlman, 2000). 
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Risk is measured as an ordinal categorical variable that can take k different values. This 
complicates its use as an explanatory variable. Although a usual way to deal with this is 
by including (k-1) dummy variables, this makes the interpretation of the results difficult 
especially because in the estimation procedure risk is interacted with the gini 
coefficient. Therefore, we resort to two different methods. The main analysis will be 
done with a method first developed by Terza (1987), which transforms a categorical 
ordered variable into a continuous one by assuming a normal distribution of the 
answers. In addition, we will check whether the results are sensitive to this method by 
assuming that, as for life satisfaction, the answers to the willingness to take risks are 
cardinal. This means that the distance between the categories is identical and, for 
example, an individual answering a 6 is twice as much willing to take risks as an 
individual answering a 3.  
 
Inequality: the gini coefficient 
To examine the impact of inequality on life satisfaction or utility, we need to estimate a 
measure of inequality that is able to reflect individual’s perceptions. To this end, we 
will measure inequality at the federal level, which is an area close to the individual. In 
order to capture yearly changes, the inequality measure will be allowed to change every 
year. This means that we distinguish among 16 different federal states in 11 different 
time periods. In line with the literature, inequality in the region will be measured by the 
gini coefficient using the household income information provided in the SOEP data as 
described in Section 3.3. The transformation from reported to equivalent household 
income is done by weighting the first adult by 1, the second and subsequent adults by 
0.5, and each child by 0.3.  
 
3.3 The data and the variables used in the analysis 
The empirical analysis uses the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)5, a 
representative German household panel that started in 1984 in West Germany and 
includes East German respondents since 1990. In the present paper we use the years 
1997 to 2007 (11 years). Table 1 presents the averages for the main variables used in 
the empirical analysis. 
                                                 
5 A detailed description of the German SOEP can be found in Wagner et al. (1993). The SOEP is 
organized by the German Institute for Economic Research (Berlin). We are grateful to them and to the 
project director Prof. Dr. G. Wagner for making this data set available.  
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Table 1 shows that on average individuals are rather satisfied with their life, which is a 
usual finding in Western societies. Although the gini coefficient is calculated by using 
equivalent income, in explaining life satisfaction we use household income. The reason 
behind this decision is that if we were to use equivalent income we would be imposing 
the same transformation to all individuals and we would therefore ignore the different 
consumption patterns and preferences that households may have. In order to control for 
differences in household size, however, the regression equation for life satisfaction 
introduces the number of adults and children as explanatory variables. The regression 
analysis also includes other individual characteristics that are typically found important 
determinants of life satisfaction: age of the individual (introduced in logarithms and the 
squared of it), gender, whether the individual is of German origin, has a partner, is 
unemployed or does not work, and suffers from some disability. Table 1 shows, for 
example, that 92% of all respondents are of German origin and that the average age is 
47 years old. 
 
Table 1: Sample averages, German SOEP 1997-2007 
Variable Average St. Dev. 
Life Satisfaction 0 to 10  6.982 1.761 
Household income (per month, after taxes) 2608 1778 
Equivalent household income (per month, after taxes) 1429 1010 
Individual age (>16) 46.848 16.972 
Individual is a male [0,1] 0.477 0.499 
Individual is of German origin [0,1] 0.919 0.273 
Individual has a partner [0,1] 0.622 0.485 
Individuals is unemployed [0,1] 0.063 0.244 
Individual does not work [0,1] 0.422 0.494 
Individual is disabled [0,1] 0.113 0.317 
Number of adults in the household (1 to 11) 2.487 1.024 
Number children in the household (0 to 9) 0.520 0.889 
Years of education (7 to 18) 11.981 2.635 
Risk 0 to 10 4.475 2.355 
Gini of the Federal State 0.273 0.037 
 
The average willingness to take risk is calculated using the observations for 2004 and 
2006, the two years in which the question was asked. The average of the two years is 
4.5. In 2004, most individuals (22%) were concentrated at 5 and 46% of them reported 
a 4 or less. Of the remaining individuals, the vast majority (91% of them) report a 
willingness to take risk equal to 6, 7 or 8. This means that only 2.7% of the total sample 
reported a 9 and a 10. In 2006, the average willingness to take risk was a bit larger than 
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in 2004, but the distribution of the answers is very similar in the two years (see section 
3.2). The average gini coefficient across the sixteen federal states is 0.279. To calculate 
this coefficient we use the income distribution of each federal state. According to 
United Nations Human Development Report (2009), the gini coefficient for the whole 
Germany was 0.283.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 The effect of inequality on satisfaction 
Table 2 shows the results when regressing equation (4) with individual fixed effects and 
random effects. In the first specification we do not allow risk attitudes to play any role 
on life satisfaction (i.e. we impose β2=β3=0). In this specification we find the expected 
negative relationship between inequality (measured by the gini coefficient) and life 
satisfaction and very similar coefficients —with a statistical significance at 5.1% with 
fixed effects and at 3.5% with random effects. This means that on average individuals 
dislike inequality. This finding is in line with the previous literature that has also used 
subjective measures to empirically test inequality aversion in Western European 
countries (Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2004; and Schwarze and Harpfer, 2007). 
 
The coefficient estimates for the control variables offer no surprises and are robust to 
the econometric method: we find the usual positive relationship between life 
satisfaction and household income, having a partner, and the number of children and 
the also common negative relationship between satisfaction and being unemployed, not 
working,6 being disabled, and the number of adults in the household. In order to control 
for time and region characteristics and to distinguish them from the inequality in the 
region and year, we include a set of dummy variables indicating the region and year 
where the respondent lives. Many of these dummy variables are statistically significant, 
indicating the relevance of regional and time characteristics (see Appendix Tables A1 
and A2).  
 
When using individual fixed effects, all the effect of variables that are constant over 
time can not be identified. Besides gender and whether the individual is of German 
origin, we can also not include age, as its effect is difficult to identify when one 
                                                 
6 This is not statistically significant with random effects. 
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includes a constant and time dummy variables. These effects can however be estimated 
with individual random effects. The estimates for the time-invariant covariates are also 
in line with the literature, notably, there is a u-shape relationship between age and life 
satisfaction with a minimum at about 50 years old.  
 
Table 2: Life Satisfaction. German SOEP, 1997-2004 FE and RE estimators. 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
 Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects 
 Coeff t-
value 
Coeff t-value Coeff t-value Coeff t-value Coeff t-value Coeff t-value 
Constant 4.184 20.70 11.380 18.55 4.182 20.69 11.708 19.11 4.207 20.82 11.892 19.37 
Gini (year/federal) -0.568 -1.95 -0.607 -2.11 -0.557 -1.92 -0.598 -2.08 -0.531 -1.83 -0.578 -2.01 
Willing. to take risk * gini     0.181 7.26 0.267 13.26 0.752 6.79 0.758 7.25 
Willingness to take risk         -0.167 -5.29 -0.141 -4.79 
Ln(age)   -5.576 -16.71   -5.702 -17.10   -5.809 -17.39 
Ln(age)^2   0.714 15.63   0.737 16.15   0.751 16.42 
Male   -0.044 -2.79   -0.070 -4.40   -0.068 -4.29 
German origin   0.048 1.73   0.039 1.42   0.040 1.45 
Ln(household income) 0.348 25.74 0.337 24.96 0.348 25.73 0.336 24.95 0.347 25.60 0.335 24.82 
Individual has a partner 0.191 10.68 0.229 15.91 0.191 10.70 0.232 16.11 0.189 10.56 0.232 16.13 
Individual is unemployed -0.534 -29.65 -0.604 -35.22 -0.534 -29.64 -0.607 -35.39 -0.535 -29.72 -0.607 -35.38 
Individual does not work -0.028 -2.12 0.001 0.09 -0.028 -2.13 0.003 0.26 -0.027 -2.07 0.002 0.17 
Individual is disabled -0.252 -12.68 -0.460 -27.78 -0.251 -12.63 -0.457 -27.60 -0.250 -12.59 -0.457 -27.59 
Ln(number of adults) -0.247 -8.84 -0.260 -9.36 -0.247 -8.85 -0.261 -9.41 -0.245 -8.76 -0.260 -9.36 
Ln(number of children +1) 0.045 2.87 0.066 4.23 0.045 2.88 0.066 4.23 0.046 2.96 0.067 4.31 
Ln(years of education) 0.052 0.87 0.236 3.88 0.050 0.84 0.235 3.86 0.041 0.68 0.230 3.78 
Mean(Ln(household income))   0.549 22.34   0.531 21.61   0.533 21.71 
Mean(Ln(yearseducation))   0.003 0.03   -0.021 -0.27   -0.011 -0.15 
Mean(LN(nbradults))   -0.546 -10.64   -0.526 -10.26   -0.530 -10.34 
Mean(Ln(nbrchildren+1))   -0.022 -0.79   -0.020 -0.73   -0.019 -0.67 
Time & Region(Federal) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2: Within 0.039  0.036  0.039  0.036  0.039  0.036  
Number of Observations 170789  170789  170789  170789  170789  170789  
Number of Individuals 24168  24168  24168  24168  24168  24168 Yes 
4.2 The role of risk on shaping inequality aversion 
This section focuses on the main empirical test of this paper, namely to examine the 
role that individual’s risk attitudes have on determining inequality aversion. We 
include, besides the gini coefficient, an interaction term between risk attitudes and 
inequality and we do not allow risk attitudes to have an independent effect on life 
satisfaction. In other words, we regress equation (4) setting β3=0. The results are shown 
in specification 2, Table 2. In a second specification, in addition to the interaction term 
between risk attitudes and inequality (β2*I*R, equation (4)), we include risk attitude in 
the regression (β3, equation (4)). Although this specification is regressed both with 
individual fixed and random effects, it is important to keep in mind that risk attitude is 
imposed to be fairly constant over the sample period (see section 3.2), which means 
that the fixed effects specification with β3  0 must be taken with caution. Nevertheless, 
the results of this third specification show that fixed and random effects give almost 
identical estimates, which are not statistically significantly different. The results of this 
last specification are shown in specification 3, Table 2. 
 
The risk attitude measure originally recoded in a 0 to 10 scale is transformed into a new 
variable that ranges from -1.89 to 2.66 (see Section 3.2). The lowest level represents 
individuals who reported a 0 in their willingness to take risks. The highest level 
corresponds to individuals who reported a 10, i.e. they are “fully prepared to take 
risks”. In other words, the largest the value of the risk measure, the least risk averse the 
individual is. Although the magnitude differs, the coefficient of the interaction term 
between risk attitudes and the gini coefficient is positive for all specifications and all 
econometric approaches. This means that more risk averse individuals are also more 
inequality averse, i.e., β2 in equation (4) is positive. Like in the first specification, the 
magnitude of the effect of the gini coefficient and of its interaction with risk attitudes 
on life satisfaction is very similar in the two econometric methods (i.e. fixed and 
random individual effects). It is important to notice that introducing the interaction term 
however does not change the impact of inequality on life satisfaction (with fixed effects 
the effect changes from -0.568 to -0.557).7 
                                                 
7 Notice that the direct comparison of the two β1s is meaningful since the mean transformed willingness to 
take risk is 0 (about 4.5 in the original scale). 
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To interpret the role of risk attitudes, we examine how inequality aversion changes with 
reported risk attitudes. The results show that for the most risk averse individuals 
(reporting a 0 on the 0 to 10 scale), the effect that the inequality has on life satisfaction 
is -0.900 [-0.557+(-1.89*0.181)] with individual fixed effects and -1.104 with random 
effects. For the least risk averse (reporting a 10), the effect is -0.075 [-
0.557+(2.66*0.181)] with individual fixed effects and +0.112 with individual random 
effects. For an individual responding a 5 (modal response), the effect of the gini 
coefficient on life satisfaction is -0.569 [-0.557(+0.157*0.181)] with individual fixed 
effects and -0.556 with random effects. This effect (i.e. the total effect of inequality on 
life satisfaction) is only positive for individuals who report a 10 (about 1% of the 
sample) on their willingness to take risks. In sum, the effect of inequality on life 
satisfaction is negative for almost all individuals. 
 
The third and last specification allows for risk attitude to have an independent effect on 
life satisfaction. Since risk attitudes are by construction fairly constant over time (it is 
only recoded in two of the eleven years), the results with individual fixed effects should 
be taken with caution, although they are very similar to the random effects ones. The 
results show that all three coefficients (β1, β2, and β3) are statistically significant, 
although the gini coefficient with fixed effects only at 6.8%. In line with the results in 
specification 2, the effect that inequality has on life satisfaction decreases with 
increasing willingness to take risks. For the most risk averse individuals the coefficient 
of inequality on life satisfaction is -1.956 with fixed effects and -2.015 with random 
effects, both effects are larger than in specification 2. For the least risk averse the effect 
is 1.468 with individual fixed effects and 1.437 with random effect. For most 
individuals the gini coefficient is negative, as in specification 2. Notwithstanding this, 
with specification 3, inequality exerts a positive effect for 21% of the individuals (as 
opposed to about 1% in specification 2), those reporting a 7 or more on the 0 to 10 
scale.  
 
In sum, the results using self reported life satisfaction as a proxy for utility (stated 
method) indicate that risk attitudes and inequality aversion are related to the extend that 
risk attitudes determine the effect that inequality has on life satisfaction. In other words, 
the dislike for inequality is related to risk attitudes and most risk averse individuals are 
also more inequality averse. Nevertheless the two concepts are not identical, which 
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means that individuals’ inequality aversion does not entirely come from their risk 
attitudes. This implies that risk attitudes are not a good proxy for inequality aversion. 
 
4.3 Is it risk attitudes or is it something else? 
The literature suggests that there is a relationship between risk attitudes and individual 
characteristics. Therefore, one could argue that the relationship we found between risk 
attitudes and inequality aversion is not due to risk attitudes themselves but rather to 
other personal characteristics that correlate with it, notably gender, education and 
income (Hartog, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, and Jonker, 2002). For example, since on average 
years of education is negatively correlated with risk aversion and lower educated 
individuals face greater income fluctuations, it could be that the stronger dislike for 
inequality of risk averse individuals runs through education. Similar arguments can be 
raised for women and low income people, both of whom are on average more risk 
averse and face larger income uncertainties. In order to examine this possibility, the 
regressions presented in specifications 2 and 3 of Table 2 are now augmented by 
introducing an interaction term between the gini coefficient, on the one hand, and the 
gender, years of education, and household income of the respondent, on the other. Since 
in any of the specifications the interaction with gender was statistically significant, we 
do not present the results here. Table 3 shows the results with random and fixed effects 
when we interact the gini coefficient not only with risk attitudes but also with years of 
education and household income. The interaction terms between gini, on the one hand, 
and household income and years of education, on the other, show statistically 
significant coefficients for some specifications. 
 
The most important finding is that the interaction term between gini and risk attitudes 
remains statistically significant and of the same sign and magnitude as in Table 2. This 
means that the relationship found in section 4.2 between risk attitudes and inequality 
aversion remains. The coefficient for the gini coefficient however becomes statistically 
insignificant. The impact that this has for life satisfaction can not be evaluated 
independently of the interaction term between the gini and the logarithm of household 
income, which is negative, and years of education, which is positive. To evaluate the 
magnitude of the gini coefficient, we examine the effect of inequality for an individual 
with an average household income (2068 euros per month, or 7.71 in logarithms) and 
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average years of education (12 years, or 2.46 in logarithms). Ignoring the interaction 
between risk attitudes and the gini, the effect of inequality on life satisfaction for this 
individual ranges from -0.566 to -0.510 depending on the specification used. This 
means that the effect of inequality on life satisfaction is similar to the one described in 
Table 2. We can therefore conclude that the inclusion of the interaction terms between 
gini and individuals’ income and years of education changes neither the effect of 
inequality on life satisfaction nor the relationship between inequality and risk attitudes. 
 
Table 3: Life Satisfaction. German SOEP, 1997-2004 
 Specif. 1, FE Specif. 2, FE Specif. 1, RE Specif. 2, RE 
 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
Constant 4.294 7.71 3.872 6.88 11.256 14.33 11.039 14.03 
Gini (year/region) -1.042 -0.55 0.620 0.32 0.953 0.54 2.415 1.35 
Willingness to take risk   -0.167 -5.20   -0.145 -4.85 
Willg. to take risk * gini 0.181 7.25 0.752 6.68 0.268 13.29 0.773 7.28 
Ln(housd.income) * gini -0.331 -1.56 -0.411 -1.93 -0.588 -2.95 -0.661 -3.30 
Ln(years education) * gini 1.241 2.11 0.830 1.40 1.227 2.24 0.870 1.57 
Ln(age)     -5.702 -17.11 -5.813 -17.40 
Ln2(age)     0.737 16.15 0.751 16.44 
Male     -0.070 -4.41 -0.068 -4.30 
German origin     0.040 1.44 0.040 1.46 
Ln(household income) 0.439 7.26 0.460 7.59 0.499 8.76 0.517 9.07 
Individual has a partner 0.191 10.67 0.190 10.58 0.232 16.12 0.232 16.16 
Individual is unemployed -0.533 -
29.60 
-0.535 -
29.66 
-0.606 -35.30 -0.605 -35.26 
Individual does not work -0.028 -2.09 -0.027 -2.05 0.004 0.30 0.003 0.21 
Individual is disabled -0.251 -
12.62 
-0.251 -
12.60 
-0.457 -27.61 -0.457 -27.62 
Ln(number of adults) -0.249 -8.90 -0.247 -8.84 -0.264 -9.51 -0.263 -9.49 
Ln(number of children +1) 0.043 2.78 0.045 2.85 0.063 4.07 0.064 4.15 
Ln(years of education) -0.281 -1.67 -0.180 -1.07 -0.092 -0.58 -0.002 -0.01 
Mean(Ln(houseincome)     0.536 21.78 0.539 21.89 
Mean(Ln(yearseducation))     -0.036 -0.48 -0.023 -0.30 
Mean(LN(nbradults))     -0.528 -10.30 -0.533 -10.40 
Mean(Ln(nbrchildren+1))     -0.017 -0.60 -0.015 -0.53 
Time & Region(Federal) 
dummies 
yes  1. yes  1. yes  1. yes  
R2: Within 0.039  0.039  0.036  0.036  
Number of Observations 170789  170789  170789  170789  
Number of Individuals 24168  24168  24168  24168  
 
The results presented in Table 3 indicate that inequality aversion increases with income, 
as if inequality were a `luxury´ good. This finding is in line with some of the existing 
empirical evidence (Alesina, DiTella and MacCulloch, 2004 find that rich Americans 
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care more for inequality than poor country fellows when splitting the sample into theses 
two groups) but at odds with some other results (see Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; and 
Alesina and Giuliano, 2009 for two recent contributions). For education, the effect is 
the opposite. This may be capturing the effect of prospects of upward mobility (see 
Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2004 for a similar argument).  
 
In sum, these results show that taking due account of the possible interactions between 
individual characteristics known to be correlated with risk attitudes and the gini 
coefficient does not change the role that risk attitudes play on shaping inequality 
aversion. Therefore, the conclusions reached in section 4.2 remains, i.e. risk averse 
individuals dislike inequality more than risk taking individuals.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Individual preference parameters are central to the modeling and understanding of 
individual behavior. The dislike people may have for inequality and their tolerance to 
accept or undertake risk are two such important parameters. Although these two 
attitudes are conceptually distinct from each other, inequality aversion has, for a long 
time, been proxied with estimates of risk aversion. Only recently, researchers have 
started to elicit individual preferences for equality separately from individuals’ attitudes 
towards risk and have explored the relationship between the two. This has been mostly 
done by means of experiments. 
 
This paper employs two direct measures of utility and risk from a large and 
representative panel data set for Germany (SOEP) to identify and estimate inequality 
aversion and risk aversion, separately. To the best of our knowledge these are the first 
estimates ever obtained from representative survey data. We also explore the 
relationship between inequality and risk aversion, and find that risk attitudes help shape 
individual preferences for equality: inequality and risk aversion appear to be related, so 
that more risk averse individuals are also found to be more inequality averse. These 
findings are in line with patterns found in experimental setups.  
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Even though our results indicate that these two preference parameters are related, the 
results also show that the two concepts are not identical. This indicates that individuals’ 
inequality aversion does not come from their risk attitude but probably from other 
parameters long discussed in the literature, such as perceptions of mobility and social 
norms and fairness perceptions. This means that inequality aversion can not be 
adequately proxy with risk attitudes. 
 
Although risk attitudes are found to correlate with personal characteristics, our findings 
clearly suggest that these attributes do not hinder the role of risk attitudes in shaping 
preferences for equality. Finally, contrary to the predictions of basic models but also to 
some recent empirical evidence (Meltzer and Richards, 1981; Alesina and Giuliano, 
2009)), we find that inequality aversion seems to be a luxury good: increases with 
income more than proportionally.  
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APPENDIX 
This appendix presents the complete regression results for Table 2 (Table A1 with fixed 
effects and Table A2 with random effects) and Table 3 (Table A3). 
 
Table A1: Life Satisfaction. German SOEP, 1997-2004 FE estimator. 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
 Coeff t-value Coeff t-value Coeff t-value 
Constant 4.184 20.70 4.182 20.69 4.207 20.82 
Time dummy (ref. 2007)       
Time dummy year 1997 0.333 14.31 0.339 14.58 0.337 14.46 
Time dummy year 1998 0.424 19.41 0.430 19.68 0.428 19.58 
Time dummy year 1999 0.449 20.57 0.455 20.85 0.453 20.75 
Time dummy year 2000 0.399 21.36 0.405 21.68 0.403 21.57 
Time dummy year 2001 0.415 21.86 0.421 22.18 0.419 22.09 
Time dummy year 2002  0.248 18.03 0.254 18.48 0.254 18.47 
Time dummy year 2003 0.160 12.14 0.167 12.62 0.166 12.59 
Time dummy year 2004 -0.029 -2.17 -0.022 -1.66 -0.022 -1.68 
Time dummy year 2005 0.108 8.12 0.108 8.13 0.108 8.11 
Time dummy year 2006 -0.006 -0.51 -0.007 -0.51 -0.007 -0.54 
       
gini (year/federal) -0.568 -1.95 -0.557 -1.92 -0.531 -1.83 
Willing. to take risk * gini   0.181 7.26 0.752 6.79 
Willingness to take risk     -0.167 -5.29 
       
Ln(household income) 0.348 25.74 0.348 25.73 0.347 25.60 
Individual has a partner 0.191 10.68 0.191 10.70 0.189 10.56 
Individual is unemployed -0.534 -29.65 -0.534 -29.64 -0.535 -29.72 
Individual does not work -0.028 -2.12 -0.028 -2.13 -0.027 -2.07 
Individual is disabled -0.252 -12.68 -0.251 -12.63 -0.250 -12.59 
Ln(number of adults) -0.247 -8.84 -0.247 -8.85 -0.245 -8.76 
Ln(number of children +1) 0.045 2.87 0.045 2.88 0.046 2.96 
Ln(years of education) 0.052 0.87 0.050 0.84 0.041 0.68 
Federal State: (ref. North Rhine-Westphalia) 
Berlin 0.034 0.32 0.031 0.29 0.030 0.27 
Schleswig-Holstein  0.259 2.29 0.256 2.27 0.256 2.27 
Hamburg 0.267 2.15 0.262 2.11 0.262 2.11 
Lower Saxony 0.414 4.86 0.413 4.84 0.411 4.83 
Bremen 0.368 2.41 0.364 2.38 0.354 2.32 
Hesse 0.524 5.59 0.522 5.57 0.509 5.44 
Rhinel.-Palatinate, Saarl. 0.299 3.02 0.303 3.07 0.306 3.10 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.160 1.86 0.162 1.90 0.165 1.93 
Bavaria 0.214 2.40 0.216 2.41 0.218 2.44 
Berlin East -0.164 -1.40 -0.160 -1.36 -0.151 -1.28 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 0.082 0.88 0.081 0.88 0.091 0.99 
Brandenburg 0.037 0.41 0.036 0.40 0.047 0.52 
Saxony - Anhalt 0.067 0.79 0.072 0.84 0.084 0.98 
Thuringia 0.076 0.89 0.079 0.92 0.091 1.05 
Saxony 0.055 0.65 0.060 0.71 0.071 0.84 
       
Std. dev. Individual fixed effect 1.324  1.320  1.322  
Std. dev. Error term 1.205  1.205  1.205  
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R2: Within 0.039  0.039  0.039  
R2: Between 0.099  0.106  0.104  
R2: Overall 0.083  0.087  0.086  
Corr(regresors, ind. fixed efft.) 0.100  0.105  0.105  
Number of Observations 17078
9  
17078
9  
17078
9 
 
Number of Individuals 24168  24168  24168  
 
Table A2: Life Satisfaction. German SOEP, 1997-2004. RE estimator.  
 Specif. 1 Specif. 2 Specif. 3 
 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
Constant 11.380 18.55 11.708 19.11 11.892 19.37 
Time dummy (ref. 2007)       
Time dummy year 1997 0.197 8.43 0.217 9.25 0.214 9.13 
Time dummy year 1998 0.301 13.71 0.320 14.53 0.317 14.42 
Time dummy year 1999 0.334 15.29 0.352 16.06 0.349 15.96 
Time dummy year 2000 0.310 16.56 0.326 17.41 0.324 17.31 
Time dummy year 2001 0.334 17.64 0.350 18.44 0.348 18.36 
Time dummy year 2002  0.180 13.12 0.196 14.19 0.195 14.18 
Time dummy year 2003 0.100 7.58 0.114 8.63 0.113 8.61 
Time dummy year 2004 -0.078 -5.96 -0.065 -4.95 -0.065 -4.95 
Time dummy year 2005 0.070 5.30 0.073 5.48 0.072 5.46 
Time dummy year 2006 -0.016 -1.24 -0.015 -1.16 -0.015 -1.18 
gini (year/federal) -0.607 -2.11 -0.598 -2.08 -0.578 -2.01 
Willg. to take risk * gini   0.267 13.26 0.758 7.25 
Willg. to take risk     -0.141 -4.79 
       
Ln(age) -5.576 -16.71 -5.702 -17.10 -5.809 -17.39 
Ln2(age) 0.714 15.63 0.737 16.15 0.751 16.42 
Male -0.044 -2.79 -0.070 -4.40 -0.068 -4.29 
German origin 0.048 1.73 0.039 1.42 0.040 1.45 
Ln(household income) 0.337 24.96 0.336 24.95 0.335 24.82 
Individual has a partner 0.229 15.91 0.232 16.11 0.232 16.13 
Individual is unemployed -0.604 -35.22 -0.607 -35.39 -0.607 -35.38 
Individual does not work 0.001 0.09 0.003 0.26 0.002 0.17 
Individual is disabled -0.460 -27.78 -0.457 -27.60 -0.457 -27.59 
Ln(number of adults) -0.260 -9.36 -0.261 -9.41 -0.260 -9.36 
Ln(number of children +1) 0.066 4.23 0.066 4.23 0.067 4.31 
Ln(years of education) 0.236 3.88 0.235 3.86 0.230 3.78 
Federal State: (ref. North Rhine-Westphalia) 
Berlin -0.222 -4.38 -0.219 -4.34 -0.220 -4.35 
Schleswig-Holstein  0.169 3.80 0.166 3.74 0.166 3.74 
Hamburg 0.199 3.35 0.191 3.21 0.190 3.20 
Lower Saxony 0.104 3.51 0.103 3.48 0.102 3.47 
Bremen 0.202 2.55 0.187 2.37 0.181 2.30 
Hesse 0.035 1.05 0.032 0.95 0.029 0.87 
Rhinel.-Palatinate, Saarl.      0.062 1.77 0.067 1.92 0.067 1.91 
Baden-Wuerttemberg -0.105 -3.79 -0.104 -3.77 -0.104 -3.74 
Bavaria 0.013 0.48 0.015 0.58 0.015 0.58 
Berlin East -0.484 -8.52 -0.486 -8.57 -0.482 -8.50 
Mecklenburg-West Pomer. -0.357 -8.77 -0.364 -8.95 -0.361 -8.87 
Brandenburg -0.446 -11.67 -0.453 -11.88 -0.449 -11.79 
Saxony – Anhalt -0.402 -10.98 -0.407 -11.16 -0.403 -11.02 
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Thuringia -0.421 -11.52 -0.428 -11.72 -0.424 -11.61 
Saxony -0.394 -11.78 -0.400 -12.00 -0.396 -11.86 
Mean(Ln(household income)) 0.549 22.34 0.531 21.61 0.533 21.71 
Mean(Ln(yearseducation)) 0.003 0.03 -0.021 -0.27 -0.011 -0.15 
Mean(LN(nbradults)) -0.546 -10.64 -0.526 -10.26 -0.530 -10.34 
Mean(Ln(nbrchildren+1)) -0.022 -0.79 -0.020 -0.73 -0.019 -0.67 
       
Std. dev. Ind. Rdm effect 1.092  1.088  1.088  
Std. dev. Error term 1.205  1.205  1.205  
R2: Within 0.036  0.036  0.036  
R2: Between 0.187  0.191  0.191  
R2: Overall 0.134  0.136  0.136  
Number of Observations 170789  170789  170789  
Number of Individuals 24168  24168  24168  
 
Table A3: Life Satisfaction. German SOEP, 1997-2004, interactions with income 
and education 
 Specif. 1, FE Specif. 2, FE Specif. 1, RE Specif. 2, RE 
 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
Constant 4.294 7.71 3.872 6.88 11.256 14.33 11.039 14.03 
Time dummy (ref. 2004)         
Time dummy year 1997  0.340 14.56 0.339 14.51 0.221 9.38 0.219 9.31 
Time dummy year 1998  0.431 19.66 0.430 19.62 0.323 14.64 0.322 14.59 
Time dummy year 1999  0.456 20.83 0.455 20.78 0.355 16.16 0.354 16.11 
Time dummy year 2000  0.406 21.69 0.405 21.63 0.329 17.53 0.328 17.47 
Time dummy year 2001  0.422 22.20 0.421 22.15 0.353 18.56 0.352 18.51 
Time dummy year 2002  0.255 18.52 0.255 18.51 0.197 14.25 0.196 14.25 
Time dummy year 2003  0.167 12.65 0.167 12.62 0.114 8.67 0.114 8.65 
Time dummy year 2004 -0.022 -1.63 -0.022 -1.65 -0.064 -4.90 -0.064 -4.90 
Time dummy year 2005  0.108 8.12 0.108 8.11 0.072 5.46 0.072 5.45 
Time dummy year 2006  -0.007 -0.52 -0.007 -0.55 -0.015 -1.17 -0.015 -1.20 
         
gini (year/region) -1.042 -0.55 0.620 0.32 0.953 0.54 2.415 1.35 
Willingness to take risk   -0.167 -5.20   -0.145 -4.85 
Willg. to take risk * gini 0.181 7.25 0.752 6.68 0.268 13.29 0.773 7.28 
Ln(housd.income) * gini -0.331 -1.56 -0.411 -1.93 -0.588 -2.95 -0.661 -3.30 
Ln(years education) * gini 1.241 2.11 0.830 1.40 1.227 2.24 0.870 1.57 
         
Ln(age)     -5.702 -17.11 -5.813 -17.40 
Ln2(age)     0.737 16.15 0.751 16.44 
Male     -0.070 -4.41 -0.068 -4.30 
German origin     0.040 1.44 0.040 1.46 
Ln(household income) 0.439 7.26 0.460 7.59 0.499 8.76 0.517 9.07 
Individual has a partner 0.191 10.67 0.190 10.58 0.232 16.12 0.232 16.16 
Individual is unemployed -0.533 -
29.60 
-0.535 -
29.66 
-0.606 -35.30 -0.605 -35.26 
Individual does not work -0.028 -2.09 -0.027 -2.05 0.004 0.30 0.003 0.21 
Individual is disabled -0.251 -
12.62 
-0.251 -
12.60 
-0.457 -27.61 -0.457 -27.62 
Ln(number of adults) -0.249 -8.90 -0.247 -8.84 -0.264 -9.51 -0.263 -9.49 
Ln(number of children +1) 0.043 2.78 0.045 2.85 0.063 4.07 0.064 4.15 
Ln(years of education) -0.281 -1.67 -0.180 -1.07 -0.092 -0.58 -0.002 -0.01 
Federal State: (ref. North Rhine-Westphalia) 
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Berlin  0.030 0.27 0.029 0.27 -0.222 -4.40 -0.223 -4.41 
Schleswig-Holstein  0.258 2.29 0.257 2.28 0.166 3.74 0.165 3.73 
Hamburg  0.263 2.11 0.262 2.11 0.189 3.18 0.189 3.18 
Lower Saxony  0.415 4.87 0.413 4.85 0.103 3.48 0.102 3.47 
Bremen  0.361 2.36 0.352 2.30 0.183 2.33 0.178 2.26 
Hesse  0.517 5.52 0.507 5.41 0.032 0.94 0.030 0.88 
Rhinel.-Palatinate, Saarl.      0.307 3.11 0.310 3.14 0.067 1.92 0.067 1.92 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.166 1.93 0.168 1.96 -0.105 -3.79 -0.104 -3.76 
Bavaria  0.217 2.43 0.220 2.46 0.016 0.60 0.016 0.60 
Berlin East -0.144 -1.23 -0.135 -1.15 -0.475 -8.36 -0.471 -8.29 
Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania 
0.090 0.97 0.100 1.08 -0.359 -8.82 -0.355 -8.72 
Brandenburg  0.046 0.50 0.056 0.62 -0.446 -11.69 -0.442 -11.58 
Saxony – Anhalt 0.084 0.98 0.097 1.12 -0.398 -10.87 -0.393 -10.72 
Thuringia  0.091 1.05 0.102 1.18 -0.420 -11.48 -0.416 -11.35 
Saxony  0.072 0.85 0.083 0.98 -0.392 -11.70 -0.386 -11.55 
         
Mean(Ln(houseincome)     0.536 21.78 0.539 21.89 
Mean(Ln(yearseducation))     -0.036 -0.48 -0.023 -0.30 
Mean(LN(nbradults))     -0.528 -10.30 -0.533 -10.40 
Mean(Ln(nbrchildren+1))     -0.017 -0.60 -0.015 -0.53 
         
Std. dev. Ind. fixed effect 1.320  1.322  1.088  1.087  
Std. dev. Error term 1.205  1.205  1.205  1.205  
R2: Within 0.039  0.039  0.036  0.036  
R2: Between 0.106  0.104  0.192  0.191  
R2: Overall 0.087  0.086  0.136  0.136  
 0.106  0.105      
Number of Observations 170789  170789  170789  170789  
Number of Individuals 24168  24168  24168  24168  
 
 
